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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of findings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
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Physician self-referral is ubiquitous. Self-referral occurs each time a physician asks a patient to 
return for an appointment, refers a patient to another colleague within the physician’s own 
medical group or refers a patient for a service (e.g., laboratory test, imaging study or surgical 
procedure) in a facility with which the physician has a financial relationship.
These examples make it apparent that it would be neither possible nor desirable to ban all forms 
of self-referral. Self-referral may be convenient for patients and may lead to better coordinated, 
more efficient, higher-quality care. On the other hand, self-referral involves physicians in two 
forms of conflict of interest: first, the physician has a financial incentive to recommend addi-
tional services—including services that may not be necessary—to patients. Second, the physician 
has a financial incentive to suggest patients have services in a facility with which the physician 
has a financial relationship and the quality of care provided at this facility may not be equal to 
that of other facilities in the area. Additionally, self-referral may give self-referring physicians 
an unfair competitive advantage over hospitals because of physicians’ ability to steer patients to 
their own facilities. 
In 1989, responding to research that showed physicians who owned physical therapy or labora-
tory facilities referred patients for these services at much higher rates than other physicians (83), 
Congress passed the “Stark Law” to regulate self-referral.1 This law covered a limited range of 
services and prohibited physicians from referring Medicare patients for these services to facili-
ties with which they have an ownership or compensation relationship (46, 76).2 Since that time, 
physician self-referral has remained a controversial topic. Congress modified the Stark law to 
cover a wider range of services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has 
been engaging in an arduous, ongoing process of translating the laws into regulations—an effort 
that continues at present (35, 46, 73, 76, 84).3 The Stark regulations prohibit self-referral for a 
broad range of “designated health services,” but allow certain important exceptions: notably, 
physicians are permitted to self-refer for designated health services performed within their own 
offices and within ambulatory surgery centers and hospitals that they own.4
Recently, interest in physician self-referral has heightened, primarily because of the rapid growth 
of physician-owned specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), and of diag-
nostic imaging performed in physician offices and in imaging facilities (Independent Diagnostic 
Testing Facilities (IDTFs)) with which physicians have a financial relationship (21, 37, 44, 45). 
Self-referral for surgical and endoscopic procedures performed within physician offices is also 
emerging as an issue. This report will address together the issues of physician self-referral and the 
growth of these facilities and services. Indeed, they cannot be adequately addressed separately: 
self-referral always occurs within an organizational context. Moreover, the effects on health 
care quality and costs of physician-owned specialty hospitals and ASCs, of imaging services and 
procedures provided in physician offices, and of physician referrals to IDTFs, depend both on 
self-referral and on the characteristics of these facilities. 
1 Section 1877 of the Social Security Act. Many states have also enacted laws governing physician self-referral; these typically 
resemble the Stark Law, but address self-referral of patients for whom the federal government is not the payer (7, 46).
2 The financial relationship typically involves physician ownership of the facility, but may instead involve relatively complex transac-
tions through which the physician can profit by providing services to patients through the facility (69).
3 Physician financial relationships with entities to which they refer patients are also governed by the federal anti-kickback law, 
which makes it a crime to knowingly offer or receive remuneration intended to induce referrals under any program for which the 
federal government purchases services. (76). 
4 ASCs have been considered to be an extension of physician offices, and it was thought (prior to the growth of physician-owned 
specialty hospitals) that individual physicians did not account for large enough shares of a hospital’s revenue to have ownership 
affect their referral decisions.
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The report will address the following questions:
1. What is the prevalence and growth of self-referral to physician-owned specialty facilities?
2. What are the factors leading to physician self-referral and to the creation of  
physician-owned specialty facilities?
3. What are the effects of physician self-referral and of physician-owned specialty facilities  
on quality, cost, access (particularly for ethnic minorities and the poor) and the organiza-
tion of health care?
Conceptual model
Many discussions of physician self-referral focus on the conflict of interest inherent in self-referral 
and implicitly use a simple model (Figure 1) that predicts that self-referral will increase the cost of 
care and possibly reduce its quality as well:
Figure 1.
However, this model fails to account for the multiple factors likely to affect physicians’ decisions. 
It also omits the complex range of effects—both desirable and undesirable—that self-referral may 
have. Figure 2 presents a model that better reflects the complexity of the factors likely to affect 
physician decision-making and the range of effects that physician self-referral may have.
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Figure 2. Causes and effects of physician self-referral and physician-owned facilities
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Figure 2 helps emphasize several important points: 
•	 Physician	decisions	to	self-refer	are	likely	to	be	affected	not	just	by	financial	incentives,	but	
by regulation and clinical incentives as well. Each of these drivers is a potential leverage 
point for changing the types and extent of self-referral. 
•	 Physician	self-referral	has	both	direct	and	indirect	effects.	
— Direct effects refer to the quality and costs of care provided by physician-owned facilities 
themselves, and the degree to which these facilities provide access to patients who may 
need care. 
— Indirect effects refer to effects that physician-owned facilities may have on other facili-
ties (typically, hospitals not owned by physicians) located in the market in which the 
physician-owned facility exists. Indirect effects typically result from actions—such as 
marketing a cardiac service line or increasing scheduling efficiency for operating rooms—
taken by general hospitals in response to the creation of physician-owned facilities such 
as specialty hospitals and ASCs (4). 
•	 Physician	self-referral	may	also	affect	quality,	costs	and	access	by	leading	to	changes	in	the	
organization of health care. For example, some specialists are merging very small practices 
into larger, single specialty groups that have the capital to purchase a CT, MRI or even  
PET scanner, and the patient volume to keep the scanner busy (13).5 Additionally, physician 
self-referral has led to the creation of new organizational forms: specialty hospitals, ASCs 
and IDTFs.
5 Larger single specialty groups may or may not provide higher-quality care—evidence is not available on this question—but 
may also have stronger negotiating leverage with health plans, thus potentially gaining higher payment rates and raising health 
care costs.
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What is the prevalence and growth of self-referral to physician-owned 
facilities?6
Physician-owned specialty hospitals
The number of specialty hospitals owned partly or wholly by physicians more 
than doubled between 2002 and 2007, and continued growth is expected (97) 
(Figure 3).7 Physician-owned specialty hospitals account for slightly more than one percent  
of all Medicare inpatient spending (95), but may have large market shares within their commu-
nities. Cardiac hospitals’ median share of cardiac surgical discharges in their markets in 2004 
was 26 percent, with some as high as 41 percent (62). The market share of orthopedic and 
surgical hospitals is generally much smaller (62). Precise figures are not available, but it appears 
that at least 70 percent of specialty hospitals, have at least some physician owners (99). The 
distinction between orthopedic and surgical hospitals is not very precise—it appears that most 
such physician-owned hospitals do both—so recent work combines the two when counting 
specialty hospitals.
Figure 3. Growth of physician-owned specialty hospitals
2002 2004 2007
Total 46 89 109
Cardiac 12 25 20
Orthopedic/Surgical 34 64 89
Source: 2002 and 2004 data from MedPAC (62); 2007 data from OIG (80)8
The number of specialty hospitals, particularly surgical hospitals, is expected to increase. These 
hospitals are relatively inexpensive to create, receive higher per case payments than ASCs for the 
same types of cases, and are permitted by Medicare, to a greater extent than ASCs, to bill for 
imaging services in addition to the per case payment (see Appendix II for a summary of Medi-
care payment methods). Anecdotal reports suggest that some surgical hospitals have been created 
simply by adding to an existing ASC a small number of beds intended for overnight admissions. 
Physician ownership interest varies widely among specialty hospitals (Figure 4). Because cardiac 
hospitals are much larger and costly to build,9	physicians	usually	create	them	in	joint	ventures	
with local general hospitals or with national corporations such as MedCath. Joint ventures are 
sometimes used for orthopedic and surgical hospitals as well (97). The median percentage owned 
by physicians is 31 percent for cardiac hospitals, 50 percent for orthopedic hospitals and 70 
percent for surgical hospitals (98). However, the ownership shares of individual physicians are 
generally small—less than 3 percent in half of hospitals (98). The higher the percentage of owner-
ship that a physician has in a specialty hospital, the more likely that physician is to refer patients 
to the specialty hospital rather than a general hospital (15). Cardiac hospitals on average receive 
6 Not all specialty hospitals and ASCs have physician owners; when this report refers to “specialty hospitals” or “ASCs,” it is referring to 
those that do have physician owners, unless otherwise specified. For imaging services, the report refers, unless otherwise specified, 
to facilities owned at least in part by physicians or to facilities with which physicians have some other form of financial relationship.
7 Author’s calculation, based on combining data from references (62) and (80).
8 The exact number of specialty hospitals at present is not known; a CMS posting on its web site suggests there may be as many 
as 130 as of November 2006 (http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/06a_DRA_Reports.asp#TopOfPage). This table 
does not include specialty hospitals focused on obstetric care, which are relatively uncommon and not increasing in number.
9 The median cardiac hospital has 56 beds; the median orthopedic or surgical hospital has 14 beds (62).
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about half of their admissions and revenue from patients referred by physician owners, while 80 
percent to 90 percent of admissions and revenues for orthopedic and surgical hospitals come from 
patients referred by physician owners (15, 16, 94).
Figure 4. Physician-owned specialty hospitals by extent of physician ownership
Source: GAO, 2003 (99)
Diagnostic imaging
In recent years, the volume of diagnostic imaging services—particularly advanced 
imaging (CT, MRI and PET scanning)—has been growing far more rapidly than 
other physician services. Between 1999 and 2004, Medicare costs for imaging services more 
than doubled (63), and these costs have continued to increase rapidly since 2004 (58). Much 
of the increase in imaging involves physician self-referral, rather than referral to non-physician-
owned facilities in which radiologists interpret the images. Between 1995 and 2005, the percentage 
of advanced imaging scans interpreted by radiologists fell from 83 percent to 58 percent (81). By 
2005, radiologists were receiving only 40 percent of Medicare payments for all imaging services 
while the percentage paid to cardiologists, for example, had increased to 25 percent (60). 
Physician self-referral for imaging takes two forms: imaging done within the physician’s medical 
group facilities and imaging done in Independent Diagnostic Testing Facilities (IDTFs).
Self-referral by physicians for imaging services within their own office or medical group prac-
tice is permitted by the Stark regulations. The number of radionuclide perfusion imaging scans 
of the heart performed in cardiologist offices more than doubled between 1998 and 2002 (50). 
For orthopedists, the number of advanced imaging procedures performed in 2005 was 33 times 
higher than in 1995; for cardiologists and family physicians the rates were 29 and 11 times higher, 
respectively (81).
The second form of self-referral for imaging is more complex: physicians are increasingly refer-
ring patients to Independent Diagnostic Testing Facilities (IDTFs) for imaging services. IDTFs 
are defined by Medicare as entities that are independent of a hospital or physician’s office in 
which licensed or certified nonphysician personnel (technicians) perform diagnostic tests (usually 
imaging studies) under physician supervision (82). Between 2000 and 2002, the number of IDTFs 
increased by more than one-third, from 1,784 to 2,403 (66); the current number may be as high 
as 5,800 or more (44). The IDTF share of advanced imaging services increased from 2.6 percent to 
23 percent between 1995 and 2005 (81). Anecdotally, IDTFs may be owned by private investors, 
for-private companies, radiologists or other physicians (44), but there is no systematic data on 
IDTF ownership. 
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The Stark regulations prohibit physicians from referring patients for imaging services to outside 
facilities with which they have a financial relationship, and the anti-kickback law prohibits physi-
cians from receiving compensation that is related to the referrals they make. However, recent 
reports suggest that physicians are using lease, time-share, and pay-per-click arrangements with 
IDTFs to profit by referring patients to these facilities while trying to remain within the law (70). 
In these arrangements, physicians either lease all or part of an imaging center for specific blocks 
of time or pay the imaging center a set fee for each scan referred. The physician then submits a 
global bill that covers both the technical component (providing the image) and the professional 
component (interpreting the image) of the scan. The physician profits from the difference between 
the payment by Medicare or private health insurance plan for the global bill and the amount the 
physician pays to the IDTF (see Appendix II).
Outpatient surgical and endoscopic procedures performed in ASCs and  
physician offices
Surgery is increasingly being done in physician offices and in ASCs. The volume of 
surgery performed in physician offices and in ASCs has been increasing rapidly, far outpacing the 
growth at hospital outpatient departments (67). Between 1999 and 2005, the volume of services 
performed in ASCs grew at seven times the rate of services performed at hospital outpatient 
departments	(67).	Eighty	percent	of	ASCs	are	owned	either	by	physicians	alone	or	through	a	joint	
venture with a hospital or corporation (67). The number of ASCs opened in the last twenty years 
has skyrocketed (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Growth in ASCs, 1985 to 2006
 
Source: MedPAC (60) and CMS (16)
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What are the factors leading to physician self-referral and to the 
creation of physician-owned specialty facilities?
Financial incentives 
•	 The	opportunity	to	be	paid	both	a	professional	fee	and	a	facility	fee:	Medicare  
and private health plans pay for services through professional fees paid to physicians and 
facility fees paid to hospitals and ASCs in which services are provided (see Appendix II).10  
By providing services within facilities they own, physicians are paid for their own services  
(the professional fee), plus receive a share of any profit generated by the facility.
•	 Fee-for-service	payment	and	the	opportunity	to	increase	the	volume	of	services	
provided (see Appendix II): Since	patients	are	not	generally	able	to	judge	whether	a	
particular service is necessary, self-referral makes it possible for physicians to increase the volume 
of services they provide. The fee-for-service payment system rewards physicians who provide 
a high volume of services. Specialty hospitals and ASCs are paid per admission and per case, 
respectively; this form of payment also encourages delivery of a high volume of services (though 
it does provide an incentive to control the cost of providing care once the patient is admitted).11
•	 The	ability	to	profit	from	services	that	use	little	of	the	physician’s	time.	Physicians’ 
incentive to increase the volume of services they provide is limited by their time (and,  
presumably, by professional ethics, which proscribe the provision of unnecessary services) (58). 
However, it requires little extra time for a physician to receive a share of profits generated by 
facility fees paid to hospitals or ASCs, or from the technical fee component of imaging services. 
The volume of imaging procedures (which require little physician time) varies threefold across 
different	areas	of	the	United	States,	twice	the	rate	of	variation	for	major	surgical	procedures	(68).
•	 Cost	containment	policies:	As Medicare and private health plans constrain physician 
payment rates, physicians seek to maintain or increase their income; self-referral to their own 
facilities is an important source of such income (83). In 2006 alone, one-fifth of physicians 
reported their practice had expanded the imaging services they provide (61). 
•	 Efficiency:	Performing procedures in the office saves physicians time and limits schedule 
disruption from traveling to the hospital. Physicians can perform more procedures per hour  
in specialty hospitals and ASCs because they control scheduling and staffing, because these 
facilities focus on a narrow range of procedures, and disruptions of scheduling for emergency 
cases are rare (14).
• Higher reimbursement for certain services: Medicare and private health plans pay more 
(compared with the cost of providing the service) for certain types of services than for others (see 
Appendix II). Procedural and imaging services are paid at higher rates than cognitive services, 
and certain types of procedures and imaging services are paid at higher rates than others (9, 34). 
This makes self-referral for these services more profitable and is an important reason for physi-
cians investing in specialty hospitals that focus on cardiac or orthopedic and surgical proce-
dures rather than, for example, on caring for patients with more general, non-surgical diseases. 
Advanced imaging services (CT, MRI and PET scanning) are also paid at relatively high rates. 
Medicare facility payment rates for surgical and endoscopic procedures vary somewhat idiosyn-
cratically across hospital outpatient departments, physician offices and ASCs, creating an incen-
tive to perform procedures in the setting in which reimbursement is highest (59).
10 The facility fee for services provided in physician offices is built into the physician’s professional fee. 
11 For information on payment methods for physician, hospital, ASC and imaging services, see Appendix 1.
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•	 Payment	policies	make	some	patients	more	profitable	than	others:	Private health 
plans usually pay more than Medicare, which in turns pays much more than Medicaid or the 
amount physicians can expect to collect from poor patients with no insurance. Additionally, 
two patients who receive the same service and have the same health insurance may neverthe-
less differ greatly in the profit they produce for providers. Medicare’s Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG) system, for example, pays a fixed amount per cardiac bypass surgery. Patients likely to 
recover quickly from the surgery, without complications, are therefore more profitable. Self-
referring physicians can refer patients to their own facilities whom they believe are likely to be 
most profitable, based on their type of insurance and their risk for complications. Patients likely 
to be unprofitable can be sent to community hospitals. 
•	 Elective	procedures	not	covered	by	health	insurance:	The demand for cosmetic 
surgery—most of which is performed in physician offices—has been increasing. Most cosmetic 
surgery is paid for by patients out-of-pocket, and is therefore profitable for physicians, since it is 
not	subject	to	the	discounting	done	by	Medicare	and	private	health	plans.
Regulatory policies 
•	 Anti-self-referral	legislation:	The Stark regulations have eliminated certain forms of self-
referral, but do not ban self-referral to specialty hospitals or ASCs, or for office-based surgical 
or imaging procedures. 
•	 Certificate	of	need	(CON)	laws:	In some states CON regulation has blocked the creation 
of specialty hospitals and ASCs. Ninety-six percent of specialty hospitals created since 1990, 
and all that are currently under development, are located in states without CON (97). Two-
thirds	of	specialty	hospitals	(97)	are	located	in	just	seven	states	and	40	percent	of	ASCs	are 
located	in	just	five	states	(67).
•	 Certification	and	licensure:	Medicare and the states require that hospitals and ASCs be 
accredited by independent organizations such as the Joint Commission. However, for Medicare 
and most states, regulation of office-based imaging and surgery is very weak or nonexistent (27).
Clinical incentives
•	 Quality	of	care:	If specialty hospitals and ASCs can function as “focused factories” that 
specialize in a relatively narrow range of services, they may be able to provide care that equals 
or exceeds the quality provided at general hospitals. 
•	 Patient	convenience	and	timeliness	of	care:	Specialty hospitals and ASCs generally 
provide amenities valued by patients such as easy parking and private rooms. Care provided 
within physician offices can be both convenient and timely. When patients require an imaging 
procedure (for example, for diagnosis of a possible fracture or pneumonia), it is convenient for 
the patient, and clinically expedient, to have the imaging done within the office of the treating 
physician. In-office imaging eliminates the need for patients to travel back and forth to other 
facilities and makes immediate diagnosis and treatment possible. 
Technology
Advances in surgical and imaging equipment and in anesthesia continually expand the possibil-
ities—both technically and financially—for providing services in an outpatient setting that previ-
ously could be provided only within a hospital.
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Emphasis on the “medical care market”
Since the advent of managed care a quarter of a century ago, many public and private policy-
makers have strenuously and vocally worked to make medical care function as a market. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the emphasis on medical care as a market encourages physicians to feel  
justified	to	act	as	entrepreneurs	whose	goal	is	to	use	their	time	in	sites	and	services	likely	to	maxi-
mize their income, even when this means competing with their local community hospital (83). 
What are the effects of physician self-referral and of physician-owned 
specialty facilities on quality, cost, access (particularly for ethnic 
minorities and the poor) and the organization of health care?
It is important to note that the effects of self-referral may vary depending on the type of facility to 
which self-referral occurs. This report will discuss self-referral to specialty hospitals and ASCs, to 
physicians’ own offices for surgical, endoscopic and imaging procedures, and to IDTFs for imaging. 
The effects of self-referral and of physician-owned specialty facilities are difficult to study, so the 
available data is quite limited at this time (see Appendix III for methodological challenges). For a 
detailed summary of empirical studies of the effects of self-referral, see the appendix available at 
www.policysynthesis.org.
Specialty hospitals 
Figure 6. Summary of data on specialty hospital self-referral effects
Effect Physician-owned specialty hospitals versus general hospitals
Access and patient selection • Patients are healthier on average
• Few Medicaid patients, more higher-income patients and fewer  
minority patients
Quality • Slightly lower risk-adjusted mortality rates
• Similar transfer rates (cardiac hospitals)
• Higher readmission rates
• Less likely to have an emergency department or a physician in the 
hospital around the clock (orthopedic and surgical hospitals)
Cost • Shorter length of stay for cardiac hospitals, but cost per case appears 
similar for cardiac hospitals and higher for orthopedic/surgical hospitals 
• Self-referral rates increase with ownership share
• Higher rates of cardiac and spinal surgery in markets with specialty 
hospitals
Organization of health care  • To date, no demonstrable effect on general hospitals’ profits or  
operations, but general hospitals do lose profitable admissions to 
specialty hospitals.
Access and patient selection
Specialty hospitals care for very few Medicaid patients—less than 4 percent of inpatient discharges 
for specialty hospitals are Medicaid patients—compared with 13 percent to 18 percent for 
competing general hospitals (15, 62, 94). They also provide very little charity care (94). Specialty 
hospital patients have higher incomes than general hospital patients (22, 43) and are less likely to 
be members of ethnic/racial minorities (22, 23).
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Access to care could be reduced if competition from specialty hospitals has an adverse effect on 
general hospitals’ profit margins, leading them to cease providing unprofitable services (such as 
mental health services) or to close. Though general hospitals unquestionably lose some profitable 
admissions to specialty hospitals, their total profit margins have not, in aggregate, been affected by 
the entry of specialty hospitals (17, 62, 90). 
It is not known to what extent, if any, the increased numbers of procedures provided in markets 
with specialty hospitals are medically indicated and to what extent they are questionable. If medi-
cally indicated, specialty hospitals fill a need by bringing services to a market that previously was 
under capacity. If questionable, specialty hospitals and/or the general hospitals with which they 
compete are engaging in “supplier-induced demand” that raises costs and may lower quality.
Quality 
Cardiac	hospitals	have	generally	been	found	to	care	for	healthier	patients	and	to	have	risk-adjusted	
mortality that is slightly, but statistically significant, lower than general hospitals (15, 22, 23, 78, 79). 
One study found equivalent mortality, except for sicker patients who had higher mortality in cardiac 
hospitals (43). Complication rates appear equal between cardiac and general hospitals (15, 22, 43). 
Transfer rates out of cardiac hospitals are the same as those for competing general hospitals (15).
There are fewer studies of orthopedic/surgical hospitals than cardiac hospitals, but the findings 
are similar. Orthopedic and surgical specialty hospitals care for healthier patients, have lower 
risk-adjusted	mortality	rates	and	have	equal	or	lower	complication	rates	compared	with	general	
hospitals (15, 21). Transfers from orthopedic/surgical hospitals are rare (15), but higher than 
general hospitals (22). 
Both cardiac and orthopedic/surgical hospitals have somewhat higher readmission rates compared 
with general hospitals (15). Higher readmission rates could be due to inappropriately early 
discharge, though the lower mortality for cardiac hospital patients suggests that such discharges, if 
they occur, are unlikely to lead to patients’ death.
The	finding	that	specialty	hospitals	have	lower	risk-adjusted	mortality	rates	should	be	viewed	with	
caution,	because	risk-adjustment	methodologies	may	underestimate	the	differences	in	health	between	
patients admitted to specialty hospitals and those admitted to general hospitals (see Appendix III). 
Nearly all cardiac hospitals have an emergency department (median, 7 beds) staffed around the 
clock (80). Only 48 percent of orthopedic/surgical hospitals have an emergency department 
(median, one bed), and only 15 percent have a physician in the hospital at all times. A recent 
study found many orthopedic/surgical hospitals have inadequate procedures in place to respond 
to emergencies; many rely on calling 911 if an emergency arises (80).
There are no systematic studies of patient experience at specialty hospitals, but one small study 
using focus groups found high satisfaction (15).
Costs
There are four ways to analyze the effect on costs of physician self-referral to specialty hospitals or to 
other physician-owned facilities. First, cost may refer to the cost to the facility of providing services 
(e.g., the cost per patient admitted). This cost will be affected by the efficiency of the facility, the 
degree to which its capacity is used (a specialty hospital that admits few patients relative to its size 
will have high per admission costs, when fixed costs are taken into account), and the degree to which 
the hospital provides services during the admission (from the point of view of what is medically 
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appropriate, too many or too few services may be provided). Second, cost may refer to the price 
that payers (e.g., Medicare and private health insurance plans) pay for a given service. If a provider 
facility has market power, the price paid may be considerably higher than the cost to the facility of 
providing a service. Third, cost may refer to the overall amount paid by payers for a given type of 
service in a given geographic area over some time period. This cost is equal to the price paid for the 
service multiplied by the volume of services provided. Fourth, cost may refer to the overall amount 
paid by payers for all services for a given population of patients in a given geographic area over some 
time period. If, for example, cardiac hospitals improve patients’ health by providing an appropriate 
increase in the volume of cardiac procedures performed in a community, the cost to payers of 
cardiac services will increase, but the overall amount they pay for health care could decrease.
As “focused factories,” specialty hospitals should be able to operate at a lower cost than general 
hospitals. The single study that addressed this issue found that cardiac specialty hospitals have a 
per inpatient discharge cost similar to that of competing general hospitals (62). Because of low 
occupancy rates, costs per discharge are higher at orthopedic and surgical hospitals than for similar 
cases at general hospitals (62). 
The finding that cardiac specialty hospitals’ cost per discharge is not lower is particularly striking 
because	two	studies	found	that,	for	cardiac	surgical	procedures,	risk	adjusted	length	of	stay	is	
nearly a day shorter in specialty hospitals compared with general hospitals (40, 58).12 There are 
three possible (and not mutually exclusive) explanations for a shorter length of stay in cardiac 
hospitals. First, it is possible that they are more efficient in providing care. Second, the research 
may	not	have	been	able	to	adequately	risk	adjust	(i.e.,	specialty	hospitals’	patients	may	have	been	
healthier	than	they	predicted	by	the	risk	adjustment	formulas).	Third,	patients	may	be	discharged	
from specialty hospitals sooner than medically indicated. As noted above, one study did find 
higher readmission rates for both cardiac and orthopedic/surgical hospitals compared with  
general hospitals (15); readmission can be caused by premature discharge. 
It is possible that per admission costs will be reduced, over time, if the increased competition 
generated by specialty hospitals results in both specialty and general hospitals finding innovative 
ways to provide care more efficiently. At present, there is no data demonstrating this effect.
Currently, no data are available on the price per service paid by payers. In theory, competition 
between specialty and general hospitals should make it possible for health plans to pay lower prices. 
When cost is conceived as the cost to payers—that is, the price paid multiplied by the volume of 
a specific type of service provided—specialty hospitals appear to increase the volume of services 
provided in a market (in the categories of services they provide). 13 Cardiac surgery rates have 
consistently been found to increase in markets after the creation of a cardiac specialty hospital  
(62, 78, 91). The only relevant study of orthopedic surgery found that rates of spinal surgery are 
much higher in markets with an orthopedic specialty hospital (71). It is possible that the higher 
volume of procedures has two sources: first, the procedures done at the specialty hospital(s); 
second, “extra” procedures (procedures that would otherwise not have been performed) done at 
general hospitals trying to make up for procedures lost to the specialty hospital. At present, no 
data are available to address the cause for the higher utilization.
12 A third study found no difference in length of stay (22).
13 There is no data on whether general hospitals increase their provision of services unrelated to those provided by specialty hospi-
tals in response to losing admissions to specialty hospitals.
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Little data is available to evaluate the effects of specialty hospitals on overall health care costs 
in a market. One study that included only five cardiac hospitals, some of which may have been 
“hospitals within hospitals” (that is, operated by general hospitals, rather than physician-owned 
specialty hospitals) found that areas where a cardiac hospital opened had somewhat lower overall 
Medicare expenditures for hospital care (for all inpatient services) than areas without a cardiac 
hospital (2).
By increasing competition, specialty hospitals could make it possible for Medicare and private 
health plans to reduce the rates they pay to both specialty and general hospitals, but to date no 
study has addressed this issue. 
Organization of health care
Though general hospitals unquestionably lose some profitable admissions to specialty hospitals, 
their total profit margins—and therefore their ability to cross-subsidize unprofitable services and 
patients—were not affected by the entry of specialty hospitals, according to three studies that 
addressed this question (17, 62, 90). A survey-based study found no systematic evidence that 
general hospitals have changed their strategies or operations in response to competition from 
specialty hospitals (94), but more in-depth interviews with hospital executives suggest that changes 
are being made (14, 24). These changes include attempts to improve relations with specialty physi-
cians and to improve operating room scheduling and efficiency, attempts to create joint venture 
specialty hospitals with physicians, and more intensive development and marketing of their own 
specialty services.
Imaging
Figure 7. Summary of data on imaging self-referral effects
Effect Self-referral for imaging: What do the data show?
Access and patient selection • No data available.
Quality • Limited available data indicate that the quality of imaging services in 
IDTFs and physician offices varies greatly and is quite poor in some 
cases.
• Increased use of CT scanning is of concern because two percent of 
all cancers in the United States are estimated to be caused by CT 
scanning. 
• Patients are significantly more likely to have imaging done on the 
same day as their office visit when seen by a self-referring physician.
Costs • Rates of diagnostic imaging, especially advanced imaging, are 
increasing rapidly; the rate of increase is much higher for physicians 
who self-refer for imaging services than for radiologists.
• Physicians who self-refer for imaging are much more likely to order 
imaging than physicians who do not self-refer.
• By 2005, radiologists were receiving only 40 percent of all Medicare 
payments for imaging services.
• Orthopedists and cardiologists are performing advanced imaging 
approximately 30 times more frequently and family physicians  
11 times more frequently, than they did ten years ago. 
Organization of health care • Some physicians—especially cardiologists, orthopedists and 
oncologists—are creating large single specialty groups in part to gain 
economies of scale for the purchase of advanced imaging equipment.
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Access and patient selection
No data are available.
Quality
The quality of imaging services depends on the equipment used, the training and experience of 
the technicians who obtain the images and the physicians who interpret them (11). Surprisingly 
little data is available on the quality of imaging. Radiology offices are considered to be the gold 
standard. Anecdotally, cardiology and orthopedics practices that perform high volumes of a limited 
number of procedures (such as nuclear medicine stress tests or MRI scans of the extremities) provide 
high-quality imaging, but there is no data to demonstrate this. Physicians in other specialties that 
perform fewer imaging services (such as primary care) have been shown in a limited number of 
small studies to provide less accurate interpretations than radiologists (6, 31) and to be far more 
likely to use inferior equipment, inadequately trained staff and poor processes of care (77, 101). 
Though the past decade has seen a phenomenal increase in the number of IDTFs, very little is 
known about them. A recent study by the Office of the Inspector General found that 43 percent 
of IDTFs were failing to meet CMS requirements (82). Deficiencies included providing unneces-
sary services (30 percent of services and 14 percent of IDTFs) and using technicians who did not 
have required licenses or certifications (13 percent of services). 
To the extent that unnecessary imaging studies are performed, quality of care is compromised by 
leading to additional, unnecessary tests and by exposing patients to radiation. It is estimated that 
at current rates of CT scanning, two percent of the cancers in the United States will be attribut-
able to CT scans (10), but this risk appears to be systematically underestimated by physicians and 
patients (48).
It is often stated that providing imaging services within physician offices increases quality because 
the service can be performed immediately, without the patient having to travel to and from 
another	facility.	When	imaging	services	are	performed	within	physician	offices,	ill	or	injured	
patients need not travel back and forth, and a diagnosis can be made and treatment begun 
immediately by the physician who is familiar with the patient and has the image in hand. Though 
no studies have addressed this issue, it is easy to understand the potential advantages of in-office 
imaging	for	patients	with	acute	problems	(e.g.,	to	determine	whether	a	patient	with	an	injured	
ankle has a fracture or whether a patient with a cough and fever has pneumonia). One study did 
show that patients of physicians who self-refer are more likely to have imaging done on the same 
day as their office visit (33). However, these advantages of self-referral are diminished or absent 
altogether when physicians refer patients to outside facilities with which they have a lease or 
pay-per-click arrangement (65) or when the problem is not acute and the imaging procedure is 
scheduled for another day.
Costs
Imaging, particularly advanced imaging (CT, MRI and PET scanning), has been the fastest 
growing physician service covered by Medicare in recent years. The most rapid increase has been 
in physician offices and IDTFs, that is, imaging that involves self-referral by non-radiologists 
(46-48, 51). Multiple studies have shown that physicians who self-refer are much more likely to 
order imaging studies (33, 42, 47, 52).
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The growth in imaging is not necessarily inappropriate. Nevertheless, three lines of evidence 
suggest that much of the increase is discretionary, at best. First, imaging rates vary threefold across 
different areas of the United States, twice the rate of variation seen with major surgical procedures, 
which are less discretionary (68). Second, the only study of IDTFs estimated that nearly one-third 
of imaging at these facilities was unnecessary (82). Third, when a large insurer made it more diffi-
cult for physicians to self-refer for imaging services, the number of imaging procedures declined 
by more than 20 percent (77).
In theory, if physicians in other specialties compete with radiologists to perform imaging services, 
the price paid for these services should decline. CMS has recently reduced the price it pays for 
imaging, especially for advanced imaging services. The very limited data available suggest that 
health plans have not negotiated lower imaging rates as a result of the increased competition (93).
Organization of health care
Some physicians—especially cardiologists, orthopedists and oncologists—are creating large  
single specialty groups in part to gain economies of scale for the purchase of advanced imaging 
equipment (13).
Office-based surgery and ASCs 
Figure 8. Summary of data on ASC and office-based surgery effects
Effect
Comparison of effects among ASCs, office-based surgery  
and hospital outpatient surgery departments (OPDs)
Access and patient selection • Patients treated in ASCs are somewhat healthier than those treated in 
OPDs.
• ASCs treat a lower percentage of Medicaid patients than OPDs.
• Patients’ share of the cost of a procedure (coinsurance) is lower in 
ASCs than in OPDs for most procedures.
Quality • Mortality and serious complication rates are similar and very low in 
ASCs and OPDs; limited data suggest that rates are higher for office-
based surgery.
• Limited data suggest that mortality and serious complication rates from  
procedures involving sedation, general anesthesia or large amounts of 
local anesthetic are higher for office-based procedures, compared with 
ASCs and OPDs, particularly for children.
Costs • Per case costs to the facility are lower for ASCs than for OPDs, and 
probably lower for physician offices than for ASCs.
Organization of health care • ASCs adversely affect hospitals’ outpatient survey volume, but there 
are no studies addressing the effect of ASCs on general hospital profit 
margins.
Access and patient selection
ASCs treat a lower percentage of Medicaid patients than hospital outpatient surgery depart-
ments (OPDs) (32, 86). Patients having surgical or endoscopic procedures in ASCs are somewhat 
healthier than those treated in OPDs (19, 30, 67, 103, 104). The relative health of patients having 
surgical procedures in physician offices, compared to ASC and hospital OPDs, is not known.
Medicare beneficiaries’ share of the payment for a procedure (coinsurance) is lower in ASCs than in 
OPDs for most procedures, though Medicare plans to reduce cost-sharing for OPDs over time (67).
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Quality
Rates of death and serious complications in ASCs and hospital outpatient departments are similar 
and are very low (19, 29, 30, 69, 75, 104). There are insufficient data on rates of death and serious 
complications from office-based surgery, but the data that do exist suggest rates may be high for 
procedures that require sedation, general anesthesia or large amounts of local anesthetic (30, 36, 
89, 100, 102). Hospital outpatient departments deal more effectively with pediatric sedation and 
general anesthetic problems than physician offices (1, 20).
It is important to note that states regulate hospitals and ASCs, and that Medicare requires them to 
meet certain standards to participate in the Medicare program; however, with the exception of a 
few states, there is little if any oversight of procedures done in physician offices. The lack of over-
sight is particularly worrisome because one-third of physicians practice in one- or two-physician 
offices where there is little or no oversight from other physicians (53).
Costs
The per case cost to hospital outpatient departments is higher than it is for ASCs (67, 83). Physi-
cian offices, which have a minimal regulatory burden and generally lower paid staff, are likely to 
have the lowest per case costs, though data are not available. No data are available on the effect 
of ASCs or office-based surgery on market-wide costs of care. There is no data available on the 
reason why ASCs have lower per case costs than OPDs. The extent to which lower costs in ASCs 
are due to efficiency rather than having a lower regulatory burden, not having to maintain an 
emergency department, and in general having lower fixed costs than hospitals, is not known.
Organization of health care
General hospitals report feeling increased competition from ASCs (14, 95), and ASCs do adversely 
affect hospitals’ outpatient volume (8, 56), but there are no studies addressing the effect of ASCs 
on general hospital profit margins.
Conclusion
The benefits and costs of physician self-referral may differ substantially, depending on the service 
in question. For example, some forms of physician self-referral—such as leasing and pay-per-click 
imaging arrangements—appear to have little potential for improving quality or controlling costs. 
These arrangements do not provide any potential benefits—such as immediate, in-office diagnosis 
and treatment, or physician involvement in operating high-quality, efficient “focused factories”—
that might result from physician self-referral for in-office imaging or to an ASC or specialty 
hospital. 
There is strong evidence that self-referral increases the utilization of health care services and 
indirect evidence suggests that at least some of this increase is not medically appropriate. Increased 
utilization will lead to increased health care costs, everything else being equal. However, the 
effects of self-referral and of physician-owned facilities on the price of services and on patients’ 
overall health are not clear; it is not yet known whether competition from physician-owned facili-
ties will lead to lower prices paid for services and/or to significantly better patient health.
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Specialty hospitals and ASCs treat patients more likely to be profitable—that is, they treat patients 
less likely to have complications, and fewer Medicaid patients—than general hospitals. 
For the types of patients treated and the narrower range of services provided, the quality of care 
provided in specialty hospitals and ASCs appears to be comparable to that provided in general 
hospitals. Orthopedic/surgical hospitals and ASCs appear less capable of dealing with emergen-
cies than general hospitals, however. Much less is known about the quality of imaging services 
in IDTFs and physician offices, and about the quality of surgical and endoscopic procedures in 
physician offices. 
Overall, general hospitals have maintained their profit margins despite competition from physi-
cian-owned facilities. This could change over time if, as is anticipated, the number and market 
share of these facilities continues to grow. 
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Physician self-referral and physician-owned facilities present difficult choices for policy-makers, for 
at least four reasons. First, their effects on the quality and cost of health care are likely to differ, 
depending on the type of self-referral and physician-owned facility, making one-size-fits-all policy-
making undesirable. Second, as this synthesis indicates, the evidence on which to base policies is 
just	beginning	to	accumulate	and	in	many	areas	is	not	decisive.	Third,	the	choice	is	not	simply	
whether to permit physician self-referral or to prohibit it, but whether to permit it, prohibit it, or 
regulate it in ways that may improve its effects on quality and costs (for example, by strengthening 
the conditions that physicians must meet to be permitted to provide imaging services in their own 
offices). Fourth, policy-makers must consider the dynamics of self-referral and of physician-owned 
facilities—that	is,	consider	not	just	their	current	effect,	but	their	likely	effects	over	time,	and	not	
just	the	quality	and	cost	of	the	care	that	physician-owned	facilities	provide,	but	their	likely	effects	
over time on competing facilities, notably general hospitals. 
Based on the evidence, policy-makers have a number of options, including making no changes 
to self-referral and physician-owned facilities until more evidence on the effects accrues. Alterna-
tively, policy-makers could:
•	 Prohibit	or	more	strictly	prohibit	certain	forms	of	self-referral	(as	has	already	been	done	to	
some extent through the Stark regulations) and/or certain forms of physician-owned specialty 
facilities.14
•	 Require	physicians	to	notify	patients	when	they	are	suggesting	a	service	involving	self-referral	
and provide patients with information about alternate facilities from which they could obtain 
the service.15
•	 Adopt	policies	aimed	at	increasing	the	quality	of	services	provided	by	facilities	to	which	
physicians self-refer. For example, Medicare, state regulators and health plans could strengthen 
their conditions of participation and oversight of ASCs, IDTFs (82, 84) and physician offices 
that want to provide imaging services or office-based surgery (27, 93). In addition, Medicare 
and states could strengthen the requirements for specialty hospitals’ capabilities to deal with 
emergencies.
•	 Change	payment	methods	so	certain	services,	patients	and	sites	of	care	are	not	more	profitable	
than others. This would reduce physician (and hospital) incentives to focus on certain services 
and patients at the expense of others and would encourage the provision of care at the site 
(physician office, ASC, specialty hospital or general hospital) most appropriate for the patient, 
rather than the site with the highest payment rate. Policies that made likely profit margins 
more equal across different types of services and sites of care would encourage the creation of 
facilities only when they are able to provide high-quality, cost-efficient care (32, 38-40, 56, 65, 
94). As noted in Appendix II, during the past few years, Medicare has explicitly moved in this 
direction, though Medicare alone cannot solve the problem.
•	 The	effects	of	increased	competition	for	general	hospitals	from	specialty	hospitals	and	ASCs	
should be monitored. Evidence to date indicates that, overall, general hospitals have been able 
to maintain their net revenues despite competition from specialty hospitals. However, there is 
no question that general hospitals lose large numbers of profitable cases to physician-owned 
specialty hospitals and ASCs, and to imaging facilities that physicians own or with which they 
14 For example, Medicare has recently adopted regulations likely to curtail, if not eliminate, pay-per-click and leasing arrangements 
based on physician self-referral for imaging (37, 92).
15 Sixteen states currently require physicians to disclose ownership interests in specialty hospitals to the patients they refer to the 
hospital (94).
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have a financial relationship. There is no evidence to indicate the extent to which general 
hospitals are maintaining their profit margins by becoming more efficient versus maintaining 
them by, for example, cutting back on their provision of unprofitable types of service and/or 
on the numbers of uninsured or poorly insured patients for whom the provide care. Over time, 
if competition from physician-owned facilities continues to increase, damage to the ability of 
general hospitals to cross-subsidize unprofitable services and patients could be come evident. 
If this were to occur, policy-makers would have to decide whether to prohibit physician-owned 
facilities or to find ways to get adequate funds to general hospitals. The latter choice might be 
preferable if evidence accumulates that physician-owned facilities are providing high-quality, 
cost-efficient care, even if only to healthier patients.16 Although from the general hospital point 
of view, physicians’ ability to select more profitable patients to refer to their own facilities is 
unfair competition, such referrals may be efficient from a societal point of view, if these facili-
ties can provide high-quality care for such patients at lower cost than general hospitals (24).
If health care were a well-functioning competitive market, the emergence of physician-owned facili-
ties would be expected to increase innovation and the quality and efficiency of care provided both 
by these facilities and their competitors. To the extent that this is not true—for example, because 
Medicare sets prices and because providers can induce demand for more services from patients 
and can use market power to gain higher prices—the potential benefits of competition will not be 
realized (5).
16 Another possibility would be to place additional requirements on physician-owned facilities. For example, several states have 
recently begun to require specialty hospitals to provide a certain minimum percentage of their care to Medicaid patients or to 
contribute to a statewide fund to support hospitals that do care for large numbers of these patients (18). New Jersey requires 
ASCs to contribute to a statewide fund. Specialty hospitals argue, however, that they provide more community benefit than 
nonprofit general hospitals, because they pay taxes and do not receive the disproportionate share payments received by some 
general hospitals (15).
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Significant policy-relevant gaps remain in our knowledge about physician self-referral, physician-
owned specialty facilities and their effects. It will be particularly important to understand more 
about both the direct effects of physician self-referral (i.e., the quality and cost of the care 
provided by physician-owned facilities) and the indirect effects (i.e., how physician-owned facili-
ties affect overall quality and costs in markets in which they exist). It will also be important to 
understand	these	effects	not	just	at	a	given	moment,	but	as	they	evolve	over	time.	It	would	be	
useful if research were funded and designed to address the following questions:
•	 How	many	physician-owned	specialty	facilities	exist	and	what	is	the	extent	of	physician	owner-
ship in these facilities?
•	 Is	increased	utilization	due	to	physician	self-referral	clinically	appropriate?
•	 What	are	the	effects	of	physician-owned	ASCs	and	specialty	hospitals	on	the	quality	and	cost	
of care in the markets in which they exist? 
•	 What	effects	do	physician-owned	ASCs	and	specialty	hospitals	have	on	the	quality	and	cost	of	
care for commercially insured patients? Studies to date focus on Medicare patients, for whom 
data is more readily available.
•	 How	does	the	percentage	of	individual	physician	or	individual	medical	group	ownership	of	an	
ASC or specialty hospital affect physicians’ referral patterns and physicians’ investment of time 
and money in ensuring that their facility provides high-quality care?
•	 What	is	the	quality	of	imaging	and	surgical	procedures	in	physician	offices	compared	with	
ASCs and hospital OPDs? Ideally, imaging studies would look beyond the accuracy of imaging 
interpretation to investigate whether patients who receive imaging in a physician office do 
better, on average, than those whom physicians referred to an outside facility for imaging.
•	 IDTFs	provide	a	large	and	increasing	percentage	of	imaging	services,	but	very	little	is	known	
about them. Who owns them and what is the quality of the imaging they provide?
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This Appendix provides a very brief summary of the payment methods used by Medicare, 
emphasizing aspects particularly relevant to specialty hospitals, ASCs and imaging services. 
Generally speaking, private health insurance plans use methods similar to those used by Medi-
care, though they pay at higher rates. For further detail on payment methods, see the refer-
ences noted in this Appendix. Payment fundamentals are clearly described in the October 2007 
Payment Basics reports provided by MedPAC, available at http://www.medpac.gov/payment_basics.
cfm. This Appendix makes liberal use of these reports.
Payment for physician services
Medicare pays for physician services (e.g., an office visit, surgical procedure or imaging proce-
dure) using the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS). The scale is created by taking into 
account the amount of physician work required to provide a service, expenses related to main-
taining a practice and liability insurance costs. The values given to these three types of resources 
are	adjusted	by	variations	in	the	input	prices	in	different	markets	and	the	total	is	multiplied	by	
a standard dollar amount, called the fee schedule’s conversion factor, to arrive at the payment 
amount. The amount of physician work for any given service is supposed to reflect the relative 
level of time, effort, skill and stress associated with providing the service.
Medicare’s system of payment for physicians is, therefore, a fee-for-service system. In addition, 
the system makes it relatively more profitable to provide certain services than others.17 Generally 
speaking, procedural services (such as surgical or imaging procedures) are more profitable than 
services that involve only thinking and talking to patients (these services are called “cognitive 
services” or “evaluation and management services”). To some extent, making certain services more 
profitable per unit of time is intended by Medicare. It is expected, for example, that an hour spent 
performing a neurosurgical procedure will provide more net income to a physician than an hour 
spent conducting routine office visits with patients. However, critics of the system argue that the 
payment differences are greater than is warranted by the relative amounts of time, effort, skill and 
stress associated with different services provided by physicians (9, 34). This is a particular concern 
when physicians provide services in which the practice expense component is particularly profit-
able or the work is overestimated. Since the practice expense payment does not consume physi-
cian time, physicians can generate profits from referral of patients to their own facilities without 
the natural limit imposed by the number of services a physician can personally perform in a day. 
Critics argue that the increase in self-referral for imaging services, in particular, results at least 
in part from this dynamic. Medicare has recently moved to reduce payments for the technical/
practice expense component of imaging services (44). It is worth noting that some specialties (e.g., 
cardiologists and orthopedic surgeons) are better positioned to provide and profit from high-end 
imaging services than other specialties (e.g., primary care physicians).
When physicians provide a service in a hospital or an ASC, they are paid via the RBRVS for their 
service. However, Medicare also pays the hospital or ASC a fee which, for purposes of this report, 
will be called the “facility fee.” (Note that for imaging and surgical services provided in a physi-
cian’s office, the facility fee is embedded in the practice expense component of the fee paid to 
the physician through the RBRVS system.) Physician owners of a specialty hospital or ASC share 
in the net revenue of the facility if the fees paid to the facility exceed the facilities’ costs. Certain 
services—notably cardiac procedures and some surgical procedures—generate more net revenue 
per case than other services. This provides a financial incentive for physicians to own cardiac and 
surgical hospitals and ASCs.
17 “More profitable” means that a physician’s net income per unit of time that he or she spends on the procedure is higher.
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Payment for hospital services:
Medicare pays for inpatient hospital services through the inpatient prospective payment system, 
which is based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). DRG payment rates are intended to cover 
the costs that reasonably efficient providers would incur in furnishing high-quality care, thereby 
rewarding providers whose costs fall below the payment rates and penalizing those with costs 
above the payment rates. DRGs categorize patients into 743 DRGs, with each DRG intended 
to group together patients with similar clinical problems who are expected to require similar 
amounts of hospital resources. Each DRG has a relative weight that reflects the expected relative 
costliness of inpatient treatment for patients in that group. The payment rates for DRGs in each 
local	market	are	determined	by	adjusting	the	base	payment	rates	to	reflect	the	input-price	level	
in the local market and then multiplying by the relative weight for each DRG. The payment rate 
is increased for facilities that operate an approved resident training program or treat a dispro-
portionate share of low-income patients. Rates are reduced for certain transfer cases and outlier 
payments are added for cases when the cost exceeds the outlier threshold. Medicare assigns each 
admitted patient to a DRG based on the discharge diagnoses and on whether certain surgical 
procedures were performed during the patient’s hospital stay. Medicare is trying to address the 
problem that some patients within a DRG category may be healthier than others by moving 
rapidly	toward	a	system	of	severity-adjusted	DRGs	known	as	Medicare	severity	(MS)	DRGs.	The	
new system has 335 base DRGS, most of which are split into two or three MS-DRGs.
Payment to ASCs, hospital outpatient departments and  
physician offices
Under the new payment system, which will be phased in over a four-year period which began 
January 1, 2008, ASCs will be paid using the Ambulatory Payment Classification system, but  
at rates that on average will be 65 percent of the rate paid to hospital outpatient departments 
(OPDs) (54).18 19 
Prior to this rule change, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) used two different 
systems to pay ASCs and OPDs, even though very similar sets of procedures are performed in 
these facilities. Both were paid on a prospective, per case basis, but relative payment rates across 
the two settings varied by the type of case. Whereas the hospital outpatient prospective payment 
system had hundreds of procedure groups (called Ambulatory Payment Classification groups, 
based on cost and clinical similarity, like the DRGs used to pay for inpatient care), whose rela-
tive value was updated annually, the ASC payment system had only nine procedure groups and 
had not been comprehensively updated in many years (96). Though the per-case cost overall is 
substantially lower for ASCs, OPDs were paid more for two-thirds of cases and ASCs were paid 
more for one-third (83).20 
In some cases, the same procedure that is commonly performed in ASCs and OPDs is also 
performed in physician offices, with the facility fee paid varying by the setting. For example, 
the 2004 ASC facility payment for an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy with biopsy was $446, 
18 The lower payment rate for ASCs was not determined on the basis of a calculation of ASC versus OPD costs, but rather was 
calculated so that it will maintain budget neutrality—i.e., the total amount expected to be paid for ASCs under the new payment 
system is about equal to what was expected to be paid if the payment system had not been changed.
19 The new payment system will result in higher rates for procedures commonly performed by some physician specialties and 
lower rates for procedures commonly performed by others (54).
20 Relative payment rates have changed somewhat since the GAO study, because the rates paid to ASCs have been frozen by 
order of Congress until 2009.
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compared to the OPD payment of $427 and the physician office rate of $208 (67). The physician 
office rate, it should be noted, is the practice expense portion of the professional fee calculated 
through the physician payment system (RBRVS).21 
The rule in effect in 2008 also expanded the number of procedures that may be performed in 
ASCs. Previously, CMS would not pay ASCs for procedures that were frequently performed in 
physician offices, exceed 90 minutes of operating room time or four hours of recovery room time, 
or pose a safety risk. Now, CMS will pay for all procedures not deemed to pose a significant safety 
risk when performed in an ASC and that do not require an overnight stay. This will significantly 
expand the number of procedures that can be performed in ASCs. However, to minimize finan-
cial incentives to shift procedures from physician offices to ASCs, for services that are performed 
in physician offices at least 50 percent of the time, payment to ASCs will be the lower of the 
rate based on the ASC payment system or the practice expense portion of the physician fee that 
applies when the procedure is performed in a physician office.
There are anecdotal reports, but no quantitative data, suggesting that one reason for physicians to 
create a physician-owned specialty hospital rather than an ASC has been to gain the often higher 
payment rates to OPDs, as well as payments for ancillary services made to OPDs but not to ASCs. 
Previously, Medicare paid OPDs, but not ASCs, a fee in addition to the per case fee, for such 
things as imaging studies related to the case; the new payment system narrows the differences in 
payment for ancillary services. This may be particularly true for orthopedic and surgical hospitals, 
some of which appear to be little more than an ASC with a few inpatient beds attached. Indeed, 
some orthopedic/surgical specialty hospitals were created on the foundation of a previously 
existing ASC. 
Payment for imaging services
Medicare divides imaging services into two components: the technical component, which is 
taking an image of the patient, and the professional component, which is a doctor’s interpretation 
of the image. Medicare may pay for the components separately if each is performed by a different 
provider or may make a global payment to one provider as payment for both components. Medi-
care pays for imaging services in physician offices and IDTFs through the physician fee schedule, 
with the technical component paid through the practice expense portion of the physician fee. For 
hospital OPDs and ASCs (in cases where the imaging services are not bundled into the case rate 
for the surgical procedure being performed), Medicare pays a professional fee to the physician 
interpreting the image and a technical fee to the facility. 
Until recently, the facility fee paid for imaging services provided in physician offices and IDTFs 
was sometimes considerably higher than the fee paid if the service was provided in an OPD; 
Congress has recently stipulated that these payment rates may no longer exceed those made to 
OPDs (44).
21 The portion of the RBRVS fee based on the required physician time and skill level is the same regardless of the setting in which a 
procedure is performed.
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Unfortunately, the data available to study physician self-referral are quite limited, particularly 
regarding physician offices. Most studies have focused on specialty hospitals and ASCs, but many 
factors make it difficult to perform methodologically sound studies of physician self-referral.
The five biggest challenges to measuring the effects of self-referral, even when data are available, 
are risk selection, determining whether the services provided were needed, determining physician 
referral patterns, determining causality, and determining the indirect effects of self-referral (how self-
referral effects the behavior of other providers, particularly general hospitals, in the community).
If physicians refer patients less likely to have complications to their own facilities, while referring 
sicker patients to general hospitals, the physician-owned facilities will appear to provide higher-
quality, lower-cost care. Cardiac, orthopedic and surgical patients cared for by specialty hospitals 
are significantly healthier than those admitted with the same principal diagnoses to general hospi-
tals (15, 22–3, 43, 72, 78, 79, 98).22	Studies	attempt	to	compensate	for	this	by	“risk	adjusting”	for	
patient	factors	likely	to	be	associated	with	complications,	but	risk	adjustment	will	be	inadequate	
to the extent these factors are incomplete compared with physicians’ more detailed, firsthand 
knowledge of patients.
Physician self-referral for a given procedure nearly always leads to an overall increase in the 
number of procedures provided in a market. It is possible to track this growth, at least for Medicare 
patients, but it is difficult to determine the extent to which the increase is appropriate—that is, the 
extent to which physician-owned facilities are providing procedures for patients who need them 
but would not have received them if they had not been provided by the physician-owned facility.
It is very difficult to determine whether physician owners have different referral patterns than 
non-owners, because in most cases it is not possible to identify the physician owners of an ASC 
or specialty hospital. 
It is difficult to demonstrate that physician-owned facilities cause specific effects in a market in 
which they are created. For example, if more cardiac bypass surgeries are performed in a market 
after entry by a specialty hospital, this could be because the market did not previously have suffi-
cient cardiac surgery facilities or it could be due to competition between the specialty hospital 
and general hospitals leading to bypass surgeries being performed even when the indications for 
surgery are not strong.
The indirect effects of physician self-referral are difficult to measure because the behavior of other 
organizations in a community, such as general hospitals, are influenced by many factors in addi-
tion to self-referral to physician-owned facilities (2). 
22 A study of 8 MedCath hospitals done by the Lewin Group found that these hospitals admitted patients with greater illness sever-
ity than competing general hospitals (25). This finding is hard to reconcile with six studies that found lower severity, but there is 
evidence that some cardiac hospitals do care for patients with illness severity equal to or greater than general hospitals.
Physician self-referral and physician-owned specialty facilities | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 15 | 31 
FindingsAppendix III Methodological Challenges
Identifying physician self-referral
One problem for researchers attempting to study physician self-referral is to determine when it 
is occurring. For specialty hospitals, for example, researchers must use a variety of techniques 
to generate a list of such hospitals, because no national census exists. The methods used differ 
slightly, but typically involve using Medicare hospital discharge data to identify hospitals with 
a high proportion of cardiac or orthopedic/surgical discharges. Once a list of specialty hospitals 
is generated, researchers interested in physician self-referral must determine, for each hospital, 
whether it has at least partial physician ownership. This must usually be done by directly 
contacting the hospitals. If researchers want to study the self-referral patterns of individual physi-
cian owners, they confront the obstacle that this information is not publicly available. They may 
attempt to obtain it directly from the hospitals or create algorithms, based on the proportion 
of admissions that a physician makes to specialty hospitals compared with general hospitals, to 
categorize physicians as owners. In some markets, many non-owner physicians have been found 
to admit to specialty hospitals so this technique is approximate as best. Although most specialty 
hospitals do have significant degree of physician ownership, it is important to be aware that some 
studies of specialty hospitals include both physician-owned and non-physician-owned specialty 
hospitals and therefore are not precisely studies of physician self-referral. 
Similar problems confront researchers who want to study physician-owned ASCs or IDTFs with 
which a physician has a financial relationship. For imaging, self-referral is, appropriately, assumed 
to occur when physicians who are not radiologists submit claims for imaging services.
Studying the effects of physician self-referral on the volume or quality of services provided
The effects of physician self-referral may be studied at three levels:
•	 at	the	hospital	level	(e.g.,	comparing	physician-owned	specialty	hospitals	with	general	hospitals)
•	 at	the	market	level	(e.g.,	comparing	markets	with	one	or	more	specialty	hospitals	with	markets	
without specialty hospitals, or comparing markets before the entry of one or more specialty 
hospitals with the same markets after entry)
•	 at	the	physician	level	(e.g.,	comparing	self-referral	physicians	with	physicians	who	do	not	self-
refer, or comparing physicians before an incentive or capability to self-refer is introduced with 
the same physicians afterward)
Researchers use two methods to assess the effects of physician self-referral. The pre-post method 
compares utilization rates and/or performance on quality measures before and after physician 
self-referral is introduced. For example, rates at which imaging studies are performed by physi-
cians may be compared before and after the organization within which they work introduces a 
payment policy that gives physicians a share of the revenues from imaging studies. Similarly, rates 
of cardiac bypass surgery before a cardiac specialty hospital enters a market may be compared 
with rates in the market after cardiac hospital entry. When the pre-post difference occurs immedi-
ately, is large, and is not obviously attributable to some other change in the physicians’ organiza-
tion or in the market, it is reasonably safe to attribute it to self-referral. However, as is typically 
the case in studies involving markets, the change over time and the differences among markets 
may not be large. In this case, researchers try to compare the changes observed with those that 
would have been expected based on trends over the previous years.
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The second method used to assess the effects of physician self-referral makes comparisons 
between physicians who self-refer and those who do not, between facilities (such as physician-
owned specialty hospitals versus general hospitals), or between markets with and without physi-
cian-owned facilities. These comparisons may be cross-sectional (such as comparing utilization 
rates between specialty and general hospitals in a given year) or longitudinal (such as comparing 
trends in cardiac bypass surgery rates over a number of years between markets which have had 
entry by one or more cardiac hospitals and markets without such entry). 
The validity of this method depends heavily on how well the comparison group is matched to 
the self-referral group. For example, if physicians refer patients less likely to have complications 
to their own facilities, while referring sicker patients to general hospitals, the physician-owned 
facilities will appear to provide higher-quality, lower-cost care. Researchers attempt to compen-
sate	for	this	by	risk	adjusting	for	patient	factors	likely	to	be	associated	with	complications,	but	
risk	adjustment	will	be	inadequate	to	the	extent	these	factors	are	incomplete	compared	to	physi-
cians’ more detailed, firsthand knowledge of patients. Similarly, cardiac hospitals may enter only 
markets in which the need for cardiac procedures seems likely to increase (for example, because 
of an aging population). If this is the case, increasing utilization rates in these markets might be 
incorrectly	attributed	to	cardiac	hospital	entry.	Researchers	sometimes	attempt	to	adjust	for	this	
by using a variety of methods to try to “match” markets.
Both the pre-post and the comparison methods described above suffer from a problem common 
to much social science research: the difficulty of distinguishing correlation from causation. If 
patients in specialty hospitals are indeed healthier on admission than those in general hospitals, the 
category “specialty hospital” will be highly correlated with good high-quality outcomes, but this 
result may not be caused by the specialty hospitals—that is, the good outcomes may not be because 
specialty	hospitals	provide	superior	care.	Studies	attempt	to	minimize	this	problem	by	risk	adjust-
ment or by attempting to match the self-referral group to a comparison group that appears to be as 
similar as possible. The ideal approach would be a randomized, controlled trial that would assign 
patients to specialty hospitals or general hospitals, or assign entry of cardiac hospitals to entering 
individual markets. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons, such studies cannot be done.
When studying specialty hospitals, researchers have the advantages that a great deal of data is 
available and that serious adverse events are relatively common (and therefore can be used as 
measures of quality). It is much more difficult to evaluate quality when such events are rare (as 
in ASCs, hospital OPDs and physician offices).
When studying either utilization rates or quality attributed to physician self-referrals, it is 
important to know the extent to which the services being provided are appropriate—that is, 
medically indicated. Simply showing that utilization rates have increased is not enough, since there 
may have been under-provision of services—perhaps due to lack of capacity—before physician-
owned facilities entered a market. Sudden and very large increases, however, should probably be 
attributed to over-utilization, unless it is very clear that there was under-capacity in the market 
prior to the entry of a physician-owned facility. Attempts could and probably should be made 
to evaluate clinical appropriateness by reviewing charts, though even with this expensive and 
labor-intensive process there is a problem in clearly distinguishing medically indicated versus 
non-indicated services.
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Finally, in analyzing the effects of physician self-referral, it is important to consider the broad 
context. For example, consider the following hypothetical but plausible scenario:
•	 Primary	care	physicians	who	self-refer	for	x-rays	of	the	extremities	within	their	offices	are	
more likely to order these x-rays than primary care physicians who refer patients to an 
outside, non-physician-owned facility where x-rays are interpreted by radiologists.
•	 Some	of	the	additional	x-rays	ordered	by	primary	care	physicians	may	not	be	necessary.
•	 Even	with	their	direct	knowledge	of	where	the	patient’s	pain	is,	primary	care	physicians	are	
somewhat less accurate in their interpretation of x-rays of the extremities than radiologists.
A	first	order	study	of	this	subject	would	find	that	primary	care	physician	self-referral	leads	to	
higher-costs and lower-quality. However, it is possible that:
•	 The	primary	care	physician’s	interpretation	of	extremity	x-rays	is	95	percent	as	accurate	as	the	
radiologist’s interpretation.
•	 The	ability	to	diagnose	and	treat	patients	immediately,	without	patients’	having	to	travel	or	
experience delays in obtaining radiology results, leads to lower costs and higher quality for 
the 95 percent of patients for whom the primary care physician’s diagnosis is correct.
In this case, studying the broader context might lead to different conclusions and different 
implications than the first order study. For example, rather than prohibiting in-office self-referral 
for x-rays of the extremities, it could be required that primary care physicians submit all x-rays 
to radiologists for a second reading. In this case, the radiologist, not the primary care physician, 
would be paid the professional fee, but the primary care physician office would be paid the 
facility fee for performing the x-ray.
Studying the effects of physician-owned facilities on general hospitals
General hospitals’ profit margins are affected by a large number of factors, so attributing changes 
in these margins to the presence of physician-owned facilities is difficult, if not impossible. 
Furthermore, though margins for hospitals overall—even within a single market—might not 
change after one or more specialty hospital enters, individual hospitals could be significantly 
affected. This would not be evident in the usual large-scale regression analyses performed to 
evaluate this question. Case studies may provide much more in-depth information, but have the 
disadvantage of not being generalizable. Furthermore, even a well-done case study may find it 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which a hospital’s profit margin is down because of a nearby 
specialty hospital versus the extent that it is down because the hospital is not well managed. 
Even more difficult than evaluating the effects of physician-owned facilities on general hospital 
profit margins are attempts—few of which have been made—to evaluate the effects of these facili-
ties on the strategic and operational policies of general hospitals. If a general hospital decides 
to expand its cardiac surgery service line, is that primarily because of the arrival of a specialty 
hospital? This would be difficult to know, perhaps even for the hospital administrators who 
make the decision. Similarly, it will be difficult to learn whether a general hospital that closes its 
mental health services is doing so primarily because the entry of a cardiac hospital has reduced 
the general hospital’s revenues from cardiac surgery.
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Lack of data
The difficulties with identifying physician-owned specialty hospitals and ASCs, and physician 
financial relationships with IDTFs, have been noted above, as has the extreme difficulty in identi-
fying the physician owners themselves. Data also are lacking in two other important areas. 
First, though a great deal of physician self-referral occurs in physician offices—for imaging, 
surgical	and	endoscopy	services—very	little	data	are	available	on	this	subject.	It	is	possible	to	
identify the occurrence of the procedures by using claims, but difficult to obtain any data on the 
outcomes of the procedures.
Second, most studies of physician self-referral use Medicare claims data because it is the only 
data generally available to researchers and includes large numbers of patients for any given physi-
cian or facility. The effects of physician self-referral for patients other than Medicare patients are 
also important to evaluate, but researchers have been able to do so only when they gain access to 
a proprietary data set, such as the data set of a particular health plan. These data sets are usually 
limited both in the number of patients involved and in the geographic area covered.
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